


This article was downloaded by: [Ireland, Carol A.]

On: 29 July 2009

Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 913493164]

Publisher Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t901392633>

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Online Publication Date: 01 September 2009

To cite this Article Ireland, Carol A. and Vecchi, Gregory M.(2009)'The Behavioral Influence Stairway Model (BISM): a framework for managing terrorist crisis situations?',Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression,1:3,203 — 218

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/19434470903017722

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19434470903017722>

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The Behavioral Influence Stairway Model (BISM): a framework for managing terrorist crisis situations?

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(Received 7 July 2007; final version received 10 July 2008)

This paper aims to discuss the application of crisis negotiation to individuals with a number of challenging traits, characteristics and behaviors, extending its application to terrorism. Such crisis situations include roof-top protests and barricades, and any context that may include the need to re-direct individuals in crisis, including terrorist activities such as hostage-taking. This paper will review the history of crisis negotiation and consider different approaches to its management. It will then discuss the relationship-building model of crisis negotiation of the Behavioral Influence Stairway Model. This is an updated variation of the Behavioral Change Stairway Model, which was first used in the wider community, and further applied here to traits and behaviors which may potentially be found in terrorist perpetrators. The application of this model to individuals who present with such traits and behaviors will be discussed, along with approaches to enhance and maximize negotiation processes with such individuals. This paper presents applications of the model and approaches to negotiation in terrorist situations.

Keywords: crisis negotiation; behavioral influence stairway model; perpetrator characteristics; terrorism

The concept of law enforcement, and more recently, crisis negotiation was first introduced by the New York Police Department in 1973. This followed two high-profile cases where both hostages and perpetrators were killed, namely the Attica Prison Riot and the Munich Olympics, where Israeli athletes were murdered when taken hostage by a terrorist group (Vecchi, Van Hasselt & Romano, 2005). A combination of a forceful and somewhat disorganized approach to the management of these events led to the development of hostage negotiation. Hostage negotiation is regarded as a method to manage such crisis situations, including terrorism, more effectively whilst reducing the risk of harm to those involved. Hostage negotiation originally focused on bargaining as the primary communicative approach. As the technique evolved over the years it became apparent that, although a bargaining approach worked well in hostage situations where hostages were taken as leverage to obtain a goal (i.e. political concessions, ransom, etc.), it did not work as well in crisis situations involving high affective instability and irrationality, such as during domestic violence events or with the mentally disordered perpetrator. As such, this gave rise to crisis intervention or

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'crisis negotiation' in situations of high emotionality and irrationality and the use of bargaining or 'hostage negotiation' in problems solving and rational situations. It should be noted, however, that 'hostage negotiation' and 'crisis negotiation' are frequently used interchangeably by the law enforcement community.

Crisis negotiation has now become the method of choice in many countries, such as in the UK, when dealing with a range of challenging incidents including hostage-taking, barricades, roof-top protests and other acts of terrorism. Faure (2004) argued that crisis negotiation is one of the various tools that can be used, even if a terrorist appears unlikely to be willing to negotiate. Crisis negotiation, by its very terminology, can be implemented as a result of a situation where there are substantial risks for those involved. This may include potential harm to a hostage and where there is increased tension and stress for all parties (Dolnik, 2004). Such negotiations can be a result of an incident where any rational decision making is vastly reduced. This can lead to extreme views, which the crisis negotiator attempts to explore and negotiate for a peaceful resolution, and to move toward a more normalized problem-solving process (Rogan & Hammer, 1995).

Hatcher, Mohandie, Turner and Gelles (1998) have defined crisis negotiation as 'the goal or mission ... to utilize verbal strategies to buy time and intervene so that the emotions of the perpetrator can decrease and rationality can increase'. Crisis negotiation strategies have further been utilized when dealing with terrorist acts, and indeed, crisis situations requiring negotiation have been further argued to include a range of behaviors and situations, including terrorism. For example, Feldmann and Johnson (1995) identified a number of motivations for an individual to take someone hostage. This included the eliciting of sympathy for radical causes (e.g. terrorists, extreme political groupings), an aim to embarrass governments (e.g. attempting to force a change in domestic or foreign policy by international terrorism) or extracting revenge for some perceived wrongful act, all of which can fall into the definition of terrorism.

Crisis negotiation has had wide reports of success, with McMains and Mullins (2006), reporting 80% of barricade incidents through the FBI being resolved peacefully using crisis negotiation. Consequently, crisis negotiation is preferred over forceful interventions, with armed assaults resulting in a 78% chance of injury or death (Dolnik, 2004), compared with up to a 95% success rate as part of crisis negotiation (McMains & Mullins, 2006).

Review of the crisis negotiation literature

Hostage taking, including that of terrorist activities, is part of crisis negotiation, and has been defined by Lanceley (1999, p. 30) as the 'holding of one or more persons against their will with the actual or implied use of force', and more recently by McMains and Mullins (2006, p. 249) as 'any incident in which people are being held by another person or persons against their will, usually by force or coercion, and demands are being made by the hostage taker'. Feldman and Johnson (1995) argue that a hostage taker may have a range of potential motivations. It should be noted that the terms 'perpetrator' and 'terrorist' will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.

Roof-top protests, acts of terrorism and barricades may be implemented for a variety of reasons, but can involve one or more individuals who can isolate themselves, such as on roof-tops, or barricade themselves in an area, to protest. Such protests may be expressive, where an emotional reaction to a situation has led to a decision to gain

a roof-top or barricade, or even take a hostage. Such expressive approaches are often a method by which the individual can ventilate emotions with often no clear goal or demands being made. Alternatively, they may be instrumental with a clear goal and motivation, often with clear demands (Vecchi et al., 2005). For example, an act of terrorism may focus on political motivations, such as attempting to change and/or influence the views and decisions of a government, or to evoke fear in a wide range of individuals and not only the hostage as a means of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause (Dolnick, 2004; UK Terrorism Act, 2000). Although terrorism as a term can hold varying definitions, it broadly involves the use or threat of violence.

The more historical and traditional approaches to a crisis situation remain in use by some countries. These involved the 'hard' and 'soft' approaches to a crisis situation (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1993; Ireland, 2007). The soft approach, sometimes referred to as 'giving in', was particularly evident in the 1970s. This form of negotiation often included agreement to the requests and demands made by the perpetrators in order to solve the crisis. One of the clearest examples of this is the case of Japan Airlines Flight 472 in 1977. This flight was hijacked by the Japanese Red Army who demanded £6 million and the release of nine imprisoned Japanese Red Army members. The response by the Japanese Prime Minister was to accept the hijacker's demands, as 'human life is more important than the world'. All hostages were then released at various points across the globe. As a result of such a 'soft' approach, demands can begin to increase in frequency and scale. For example, in September 1969, the Brazilian government freed 15 prisoners in exchange for the US Ambassador. In March 1970 the same government then freed five more to secure the return of Japanese Consul-General. In June 1970, a further 40 were released to gain the release of the US Consul-General. In January 1971 the government then freed 70 more to secure the return of the Swiss Ambassador. To end this cycle of events, the Brazilian government turned to a direct and brutal crackdown. During the 1970s and 1980s, France also had a reputation as a nation willing to negotiate and make deals with terrorists. As a result, they became a prime target for such terrorism. Despite French efforts to negotiate with perpetrators, agreements that were made were regularly broken by the terrorist organizations. Such approaches are fundamentally based on giving in to demands of the hostage taker, with the main motive being to preserve the lives of the hostages at any cost. Indeed this is made clear as part of the negotiation process and it further assumes that the perpetrators have all the power in the situation. Unfortunately, such approaches reward hostage taking as a successful strategy, with incentives to hostage takers to take more hostages, with more substantial and extensive demands.

This approach of 'giving in' to the perpetrators is not currently used systematically or widely, due to its clear ineffectiveness in managing a crisis situation. An alternative, the 'hard approach', is still utilized by some organizations and governments, and where there can be an unwillingness to consider any substantial negotiations. The hard approach can often include a heavy, direct, forceful or armed approach, often with governmental or organizational forces entering the siege area as quickly as possible. This approach can sometimes result from media and government pressures to end the crisis situation quickly, i.e. the 'action imperative'. One recent example of a hard – if somewhat disorganized – approach is the Dubrovka Theatre siege. This is where Chechen rebels stormed a Moscow theatre and took around 900 hostages on 2 October 2002. This led to a stand-off that ended after three days when Russian troops raided the building and 129 hostages were killed. Almost all of those died due to the gas government forces used to subdue the rebels. A similar hard approach occurred in the

Beslan School Hostage Crisis, when armed terrorists took hundreds of schoolchildren and adults hostage on 1 September 2004. Shooting broke out between the hostage-takers and Russian Security Forces, with 344 civilians killed, 186 of whom were children; hundreds more were wounded.

There is a range of problems with the hard approach. Ultimately risk of harm to hostages is high, as are risks to other individuals, such as the police. Such an approach can also create chaos and panic, often escalating the situation. The after-effects of such an approach can also be substantial, causing significant unrest and anger. For example, following the Dubrovka Theatre siege a number of lawsuits were filed as 60 plaintiffs claimed millions of dollars in compensation. After the Beslan hostage siege, over 135,000 people joined in an anti-terror demonstration on the Red Square in Moscow. Fundamentally, the hard approach is 'all or nothing', and if it goes wrong it can tend to go badly wrong.

While there are occasions when a hard approach is ultimately needed, it is increasingly used only when the critical negotiation process has ultimately failed. An example of this is the Iranian Embassy siege of 30 April 1980, when gunmen from the Democratic Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Arabistan held over 26 people hostage. The SAS were involved at a very early stage of this siege and the negotiation process allowed them time to install listening devices, to study plans of the building and to draw up a clear and concise means to free the hostages. Such negotiations reinforced the importance of playing for time during a crisis incident. This crisis incident led to a six day stand-off during which a number of hostages were released, and trained crisis negotiators were involved. By the third day of the siege the hostage-takers had become more unsettled and unsure whether their demands were being passed forward appropriately. As negotiations proceeded, the decision to utilize the hard approach was made when one of the hostages was killed and his body was pushed out a door of the Embassy in the early evening. With this death of a hostage, respondents determined that the siege had to be ended by force and the SAS storming the building 20 minutes after the victim's body emerged; the siege ended 15 minutes later with five gunmen and two hostages killed.

Current approaches to crisis negotiation

The Behavioral Influence Stairway Model (BISM) developed by the FBI (Vecchi et al., 2005) is the prototypic current model of crisis negotiation. This is a relationship-building process involving the negotiator and perpetrator, culminating in a peaceful settlement of the critical incident (Dalfonzo, 2002). This approach has been consistently effective in the resolution of a wide range of volatile crisis situations (Flood, 2003), including community crisis situations and in non-clinical populations. It therefore has important applications across a range of situations, including those where little information has been identified with regard to any potential mental disorder, and where simply traits and behaviors can be considered. Indeed, this model is a development from earlier approaches to crisis negotiation, which was focused on a more problem-solving approach and identifying motivations, looking to separate the individual from the problem, focusing on their interests as opposed to their positions, generating options, with a view to creating behavioral change (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1993).

The BISM now reflects a key change in the crisis negotiation literature, where there is substantially more emphasis on the importance of developing an effective

relationship between the perpetrator and negotiator, in order to bring about behavioral change and to resolve the situation peacefully (Vecchi et al., 2005). The emphasis on the relationship-building process highlights the importance of having a positive and trusting relationship between the perpetrator and negotiator if behavioral change and peaceful resolution are to take place. This is in direct contrast to earlier models that emphasized problem-solving alone. An over-emphasis on problem-solving can lead a negotiator to potentially focus too heavily on seeking the motivation behind the crisis, which may potentially lead to a tendency to rush the perpetrator to resolution. The older approaches to crisis negotiation, such as problem-solving, further assumed that the perpetrator, including the terrorist, was able to articulate their reasons for the crisis, which if emotionally driven, may be harder to do, and could potentially escalate the situation. It further assumes that the individual has detailed insight to understand in full the motivation behind their crisis, such as taking someone hostage. The older, problem-solving approach can fundamentally be more straightforward to apply. The relationship-building approach does require more awareness of the process of developing an effective relationship on behalf of the negotiator, but it can offer substantial benefits if used appropriately. As such, this model has significant value when applied to terrorist situations.

The BISM (Van Hasselt, Romano & Vecchi, 2008) is an updated adaptation of the FBI process. The BISM is a relationship-building process with four dynamic elements: active listening, empathy, rapport and influence. The process is dynamic in that a perpetrator may quickly alternate between stages. Active listening is the foundation of the BISM (Van Hasselt et al., 2008) and it takes place throughout the negotiations. Vecchi et al. (2005) argue that active listening is an attempt to lower the perpetrator's emotions, and to return them to more rational thinking. Empathy follows as a demonstration of understanding of the situation and the person's circumstances. Rapport is then developed, which is trust derived from understanding (empathy). Finally, influence occurs as the perpetrator is persuaded to change behavior from maladaptive to adaptive (Van Hasselt et al., 2008). While this model offers a clear framework, it is important to note that an individual may not always start at the first step of the negotiation process. For example, they may wish to bargain straight away and be in a position to do so. Similarly, it is important not to attempt to problem solve with an individual who is very emotional. It is important to respond to and reduce the emotive valence of the person in crisis. This model further fits with a range of crisis situations, including terrorism, and where negotiation is one among the various tools that can be used, even if a terrorist appears unlikely to be willing to negotiate (Faure, 2004). This includes the avoidance of engagement in verbal conflict and the use of active listening to give nothing away whilst *appearing* to make trade-offs, to gain time, and to re-assure the terrorist, all of which are integral within the BISM. The BISM is illustrated in Figure 1.

Further application to terrorism

The BISM (Van Hasselt et al., 2008) has considerable application to the management of some terrorist crisis situations. As with all crisis negotiation situations, the model requires application to the presented situation. Further, whilst it is not always possible to determine any potential mental disorder diagnoses for terrorists, or even whether such disorders are prevalent, it can be argued that certain challenging traits, characteristics and behaviors may be displayed by such individuals, such as impulsivity,




Figure 1. Behavioral influence stairway model (Van Hasselt et al., 2008).

emotional dysregulation, paranoia and a grandiose sense of self-worth, which highlights the need to modify crisis negotiation approaches accordingly, and as such will be presented later in this article. For example, with the terrorist perpetrator, it is important to consider that they may be more interested in how they come across to their peers, and not necessarily concerned with meeting their needs (Dolnick, 2004). This is an important consideration for a negotiator, and would have to be considered when attempting to gain empathy and rapport with the perpetrator as part of the crisis situation, and when considering the BISM. Further, and as part of terrorist acts, there may be reports of the perpetrator threatening to take their own life. It is important here to make a distinction here between a willingness to die and a desire to die. For example, do they wish to die to become martyrs or live to continue to fight for their cause (Dolnick, 2004)? Again, this is a key consideration, and one that can drive the crisis negotiation strategy.

Further, in crisis situations, such as barricades and hostage-taking, which may be considered as part of terrorist activities, only 1% of perpetrators were suicidal, with 94% willing to give up their lives, but only if they had to (Dolnick, 2004). As such, Dolnick (2004) argues that, if a terrorist reports they are determined to die during the incident, this should not be seen as an insurmountable barrier to negotiation. Indeed, emphasis on continuing to develop the relationship between the negotiator and perpetrator may be useful here, such as working through the BISM. To further illustrate the application of the BISM to crisis situations of terrorism, it is useful to illustrate its benefits in light of a terrorist activity, in this instance the Munich Olympics, where Israeli athletes were murdered when taken hostage by a terrorist group (Vecchi et al., 2005). In summary, on 5 September 1972, eight Arab terrorists entered the Olympic Village in Munich, Germany. They knocked on the door of the Israeli wrestling coach, who immediately knew something was wrong and shouted a warning. Attempts were made by two of the Israeli team to block the door while the athletes attempted to escape, but they were killed by the terrorists. The terrorists then took nine Israelis as hostages. The terrorists announced that they were Palestinian Arabs, and demanded

that Israel release 234 Arab prisoners in Israeli jails, and for Germany to release two German terrorist leaders imprisoned in Frankfurt. They also demanded their own safe passage out of Germany.

After hours of negotiations, a deal was struck with German authorities and a trip to the NATO air base at Firstenfeldbruck, by bus and then two helicopters was arranged, in order to board a plane for Cairo. German sharpshooters were standing by with orders to simultaneously kill all the terrorists without harming the hostages. The rescue plan failed and the Palestinians set off a grenade in one helicopter, killing all aboard; terrorists in the second helicopter shot to death the remaining, blindfolded, Israeli hostages. Three of the Palestinian Arabs terrorists were captured alive and held in Germany. On 29 October, a Lufthansa jet was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists who demanded that the Munich terrorists to be released. The Germans capitulated and the imprisoned terrorists were freed.

The Munich Olympics siege identified a lack of an attempt to build relationships with the terrorists at this time, and the siege took place before the value of the relationship building process between the negotiator and perpetrator(s) was considered. Indeed, it took place before any formalized considerations as to crisis negotiation had been developed. In particular, whilst negotiations were reported, these appeared to focus more on meeting the demands of the perpetrators, as opposed to emphasizing the way in which the terrorists had chosen to solve their problem as being ineffective. It also presented as a chaotic and disorganized situation, where a number of ill-considered decisions were made. In fact, one of the main advantages of the BISM is not only to offer structure to the negotiations, but also to further allow the potential to slow the process down, thus increasing rational thought and reasoned negotiation.

It is of particular value here to make parallels with such emphasis on behaviors, traits and characteristics, used within threat assessment (Borum, Fein, Vossekuil & Berglund, 1999). Threat assessment has parallels with the approach used in this article, and emphasizes the use of violence assessments that do not overly focus on mental disorder and other diagnoses and need to profile, but rather a focus on behaviors and characteristics that may lead to a heightened risk of violence. As such, it is a much more fluid approach which can lend itself well to crisis situations, and where there is not the option of detailed profiles on the perpetrators, such as terrorists. Indeed some would argue that this more fluid approach presents greater benefits overall (Borum et al., 1999). The threat assessment approach is one which is applicable across a wide range of areas where there is a threat of violence, including terrorism. As such, the consideration of this dynamic and fluid approach to assessing risk parallels and lends itself well to crisis negotiation, stressing the importance of a dynamic approach, rather than an over-emphasis on diagnoses and clear profiles. Indeed, to over-focus on the use of diagnoses and profiles may lead to the omission of key information that may be important to consider as part of crisis negotiation.

Threat consideration parallels with the approach presented in this article, with threat assessment viewing targeted violence as a result of discernable thinking and behaviors, that are not necessarily impulsive nor spontaneous acts, but indeed result from planning (Borum et al., 1999). This would certainly be considered to parallel terrorism. Further, threat assessment regards the use of violence to originate from an interaction with the perpetrator, previous stressful events, the current situation and the target, which may well include a hostage. Finally, threat assessment involves an assessment of relevant factors with regard to the target, such as the hostage or government, the level of familiarity of the perpetrator with such individuals or organizations,

the perpetrator's vulnerabilities and awareness of their own risk. All of these considerations are important as part of crisis negotiation, and the exploration of the traits, characteristics and behaviors of the perpetrator are part of these important considerations. Whilst outside the focus of this article, greater application of the threat assessment principles to crisis negotiation, such as effective use of available background information, would be considered a useful addition once information becomes available about the terrorists in question. This includes the consideration that the terrorist(s) may have communicated their intentions to others, have shown a previous interest in violence, their ability to successfully organize a crisis situation or a risk of violence (Borum et al., 1999).

Behavioral and trait considerations as part of the negotiation process

There is a little research concerning the need to modify crisis negotiation based on a perpetrator presenting certain traits and characteristics. For example, Fuselier (1981) and Strentz (1986) argue that people diagnosed with a mental disorder can make up 50% of hostage takers, and as such, can present with a range of challenging characteristics and behaviors. Consequently, it is appropriate to consider the application of crisis negotiation when attempting to negotiate with an individual who presents with a range of challenging traits, characteristics and behaviors, and who may not necessarily be classified as mentally disordered. This may include incidents such as the taking of hostages, barricades and roof-top protests. To consider all types of potential traits, characteristics and behaviors would be outside the scope of this paper. Only some key traits, characteristics and behaviors will be considered here. This will include details of information already found in the crisis negotiation literature, and which is applied here to terrorists, as well as proposed innovations.

Some terrorists may present with personality traits that are characterized by a pattern of high emotionality, affective instability and dependency on others, with the potential for marked impulsivity. Strenz (2006) presented a number of guidelines for negotiating with individuals who present with such personality traits. In particular, Strentz argues that it is important to make efforts to build self-esteem, to show understanding and to be non-judgmental, only becoming directive once rapport has been achieved. Strentz further argues that the individual in crisis may dislike those in authority, and may even choose for a hostage to negotiate on their behalf. The fostering of Stockholm Syndrome, where the hostages may react positively toward the perpetrator, is less likely with the individual who has such traits. Strentz further argues that the nature of the negotiation means that the perpetrator receives attention, and as a consequence, they may not wish for this attention to end. There is further argument that such individuals may suddenly request that they wish to exit the situation, and that they wish to come out. It is of particular importance with such individuals that they do not feel that they have 'failed' someone in some way, as this can be something which they find challenging.

In some cases, suicide or self-harm can be a real possibility. These situations are differentiated from others where dying in the act is part of the purpose, such as in martyr attacks. In the former, it is likely that the perpetrator will feel highly stressed. As such, it can be best to look to reduce any enhancement of this. For example, it would be unhelpful to tell them the tactical team is nearby, as this may enhance the stress. Further, terms such as 'surrender' are best avoided, as these are likely to further exacerbate feelings of failure in the individual (Strentz, 2006). It is furthermore

important to try to avoid situations where the person in crisis may perceive they are being abandoned. For example, changing negotiators can be a vulnerable time. It is important for the negotiator to monitor their own feelings as a negotiator about the negotiations. Any negative feelings about the negotiations may actually have been the intention of the terrorist who presents with these traits and characteristics as they seek for the negotiator to abandon them. For example, this can sometimes be in an attempt to push the negotiator away. Their real needs are likely to be more about expressing themselves, rather than any material needs. As such, any effort to focus on the problem may lead to an exacerbation of the situation. Caution should also be taken in allowing individuals in crisis to vent any feelings. If this becomes too much, they may feel less in control of themselves, and therefore distraction from the feelings would be useful here (Borum & Strentz, 1992).

Strentz (2006) further talks of the individual who has traits and behaviors such as a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others. They may further present with behaviors that present them as lacking in conscience, violating social norms, lacking empathy, having extreme impulsivity and being prone to boredom, with a need to seek stimulation and an inflated view of themselves, along with a superficial and engaging charm. Strentz argues that, to negotiate with such individuals, it is important to be aware that the individual can be self-focused and impulsive and seek immediate gratification. Strentz (2006) further argues the importance of not disclosing personal, sensitive information, as such information may be used to the advantage of the individual in crisis. It is further important to 'feed in' to their desire to have a high level of control, which is partly done by involving them in the negotiation process, such as working with their traits of feeling important, e.g. 'I know you're are smart enough to realize ...'.

Strentz (2006) emphasizes that it is important not to focus on any social or personal value of the hostages; the perpetrator is likely to gain pleasure from the distress of the hostages. As such, it is important not to let the perpetrator know that you are concerned about the hostages. It is also important to be aware that the hostages may experience positive feelings toward the perpetrator(s), but this is unlikely to be reciprocated. Strentz further argues that it is important to be conscious that a good rapport between the perpetrator and negotiator is unlikely, and as such, this step in the BISM may need to be omitted. It is important to be aware that such an individual may act impulsively, and it is therefore important to be clear about the information given to such individuals. It is likely that the perpetrator may know the answers to the questions asked, but they may attempt to 'catch you out' (Strentz, 2006).

The factors to consider when negotiating with such individuals is to emphasize the importance of not reacting emotionally to what the terrorist may say (Vecchi, 2007), and to establish credibility as a negotiator. This may include not making false promises. It is important to consider that their focus is likely to be on themselves, and as such, it would be important to consider any emphasis in the context of 'what's in it for them'. It is important to keep them busy, in an attempt to avoid harassment of the hostages, and it is of further importance to convince them that the well-being and/or safe release of the hostages is in their own best interests. They have little empathy toward others, and so any emphasis on the impact of the situation on others (e.g. family, associates) is unlikely to be helpful (Lanceley, 1999). The development of Stockholm Syndrome in the terrorist is very unlikely, but it is likely in the hostages, providing they have not been continually assaulted. It is likely that the terrorist who presents with such traits will have no positive feelings towards the hostages, and may

well regard them as simply a functional relationship. It is important that the negotiator should not count on a 'protective bond' forming, such as Stockholm Syndrome, however unusual this is.

It is also important not to attempt to lie as a negotiator about the consequences for them, based on what they have done. They will probably know the system and structures well, and are likely to be aware of at least some of these consequences (e.g. that they will be taken to prison). It is important to remember that they may present with deficiencies in their level of emotional arousal. This may allow them to remain less fearful in a stress-laden situation, such as a crisis situation. It is important to consider that silence and lack of stimulation may increase the stress level of such individuals (Lanceley, 1981), as there can be a proneness to boredom. It is important that attention should be maintained on the negotiator as the audience and the sole source of stimuli. In particular, minimizing the potential audience for the individual in crisis who presents with such traits and characteristics may assist in the management of the situation. It may be that such an individual is motivated by a need for stimulation-seeking activity. It is possible that the crisis situation, with its accompanying 'excitement', is rewarding in itself to such an individual, and there may not necessarily be any further planning or demands in relation to this. As such, any demands are likely to be instrumental in nature (Vecchi, 2007), with little emotional content.

Paranoia and distrust may be further traits and characteristics presented in some terrorists. Such paranoia can further impair reasoning and lead to emotional instability, which could lead to violent behavior. Strenz (2006) presents a number of guidelines for negotiating with individuals with such traits. Here it is important to stall for time, allowing the individual in crisis time to vent their frustrations on the negotiator, so such frustration is not placed on the hostages. The emphasis here is on showing understanding and reinforcing a sense of self-worth. It is important to be aware that the perpetrator may be fearful that the negotiator is getting 'too close' to them; they may be distrusting and suspicious. The communication of sincerity may assist in this. The importance of being sincerely interested in what the perpetrator has to say is without question. Part of this should include not confronting or challenging the individual in crisis. Stockholm Syndrome may not develop here, as the perpetrator can be distrusting and suspicious of others (Strentz, 2006).

Other traits and characteristics could include low mood in the terrorist, such as signs of depression, or even the reverse of elation, manic and impulsive behaviors. Such mood presentations may impair thinking and judgment (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). For example, when in a state of very low mood, there could be an increased risk of suicide, which may also include harming the hostages. Strenz (2006) presents a number of guidelines for negotiating with individuals who present with such traits and characteristics. In particular, if kept occupied with discussions or decisions, they are less likely to injure themselves or the hostages. If the perpetrator is in a state of high arousal, keeping the negotiations reality-orientated will be helpful. If the perpetrator is feeling grandiose, they may enjoy, and seek out, risks. It may further be that they are stimulated by the situation, not frightened by it. If the perpetrator is in a manic phase, it will not be helpful to argue with them, with the expectation of getting them to surrender. Further, if the perpetrator is in low mood, the use of sympathy, empathy and patience is important (Strentz, 2006).

Whilst the literature has begun to look more at the differences in negotiation with specific traits, characteristics and behaviors in perpetrators (Strenz, 2006), it is important to consider and develop this further. This should include the general difficulties

presented by an individual who may have acquired behavioral difficulties, such as injuries, leading to memory damage. This is particularly important in situations where the risk of head injury may be higher, such as during warfare and conflict, with situations that can fuel a greater propensity for violence. The negotiation process can be significantly impacted upon by the traits, characteristics and behaviors which a terrorist may present. As such, it is important to further develop a number of strategies for various types of traits, characteristics and behaviors that a terrorist may present with. Predictability can be enhanced if such traits and characteristics are observed and identified. Specifically, such indicators may demonstrate early signs that the individual may be experiencing difficulty in managing the crisis situation, which may lead to the use of physical violence. Further traits and characteristics, along with suggested management strategies, are presented below.

Emotional dysregulation, limited attention span and consequent impulsivity

Individuals may present with challenges to their ability to manage their emotions and with a poor attention span; they may be distractible and impulsive, requiring extra time to consider any decisions made. Although not exclusively, this characteristic can sometimes be acquired through an earlier head injury or a range of other factors. This is of particular importance when there are several individuals who have challenges in managing their day-to-day situations, such as difficulties in processing information effectively, but for all intents and purposes appear reasonably coherent to others. Such individuals may present with poor memory recall and recognition, limited concentration, difficulties in their capacity to formulate logical thoughts and/or reason, and challenges in effectively managing their emotions. There are a number of broad areas where difficulties may appear, general difficulties and those more focused on problem-solving and higher-order thinking, which may be recognized in such individuals.

With regard to general difficulties, there are four broad areas: verbal comprehension, perceptual organization, processing speed and working memory (as assessed by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, WAIS III; Wechsler, 1997), although working memory is also a component of problem-solving. Verbal comprehension abilities are the capacity to reason and verbalize. Perceptual organization is the capacity to learn and respond to new visual symbols and patterns (not necessarily dependent upon their educational status). Processing speed is the ability to process information given, using a combination of motor speed, reaction time, thinking speed and ability to visually scan information quickly. Finally, working memory is an important part of problem-solving via a complex process to complete mundane tasks, sometimes defined as the ability to 'shift perspectives on a problem, define goals while considering several parameters of a problem simultaneously, plan a strategy while anticipating consequences, execute steps of a plan held in memory, monitor progress, detect and correct errors, and accommodate new data while filtering out interference' (Seguin, Assad, Nagin, & Tremblay, 2004), all of which can potentially be recognized as part of the crisis situation.

Impairments to a wide range of problem-solving and higher-order functioning difficulties are implicated in a wide range of challenging behaviors, and are defined as 'sustaining attention and concentration, abstract reasoning and concept formation, goal formulation, anticipation and planning, programming and initiating purposive sequences of behavior, self-monitoring and self-awareness and [difficulties in]

inhibition of unsuccessful, inappropriate, or impulsive behaviors' (Caspi & Moffitt, 1995).

It is important to consider that such behaviors may appear subtle, whereas others are more overt. Alternatively, they may be mislabeled as some other challenging behavior, such as an unwillingness to engage in requests made, or appearing flat in emotion or motivation, as opposed to a genuine difficulty in managing the requests and discussions made. In particular, it is important to consider that such terrorists may have entered into the crisis situation impulsively and with little idea as to what they actually want from the situation (if anything).

As such, there are a number of factors to consider when negotiating with a terrorist who presents with such difficulties as emotional dysregulation, poor attention span, slow ability to process information, with limited problem-solving concepts. It is important to consider that they may tire quickly, particularly after a cognitively demanding task. As a result, judgment may decrease, stress levels may increase and the situation may escalate as a result. Their ability to retain information may be low, with potentially poor attention and concentration. They may present as irritable and easily distracted, with a tendency to take literally what is discussed. In particular, there is a risk they may mask their lack of understanding, presenting with a desire to understand what is being discussed with them by the negotiator, while they do not really understand. They may continually focus on the same issue, with an inability to move away from this. In particular, it is important not to expect them to demonstrate empathy. They may have difficulty in recognizing emotions in themselves and others. As a result, 'Stockholm Syndrome', unusually, may not develop.

It is important to consider that they may generally find it difficult to solve problems. The difficulty may lie in defining the problem when asked, generating possible/suitable options when encouraged, making a selection, acting on it and evaluating. As a result, they may make the wrong decision, although they feel it is correct, despite such a decision appearing illogical and irrational to others. They may further present as disinhibited, such as making inappropriate and impulsive comments to the negotiator. They may struggle to communicate effectively, both listening to and processing what is being said. This may lead to misinterpretations, with a limited ability to express themselves effectively (Ducharme, 2000). They may further be socially imperceptive, such as engaging in inappropriate behaviors with regard to a hostage or negotiator. They may struggle with the concept of time, either losing time or keeping to it rigidly. It is important to consider that they may become easily overwhelmed, for example, if too much information is provided too quickly, or if they are asked to do something outside of their abilities (or if their abilities are over-estimated). They may further find it difficult to manage their emotions successfully. This may include a flattened/heightened affect of emotion, an explosive temper or becoming easily agitated, impatient or irritable (Alderman, 2003). They may further become angry or disruptive in an effort to manage the situation.

Management strategies

As a result of such challenges in presentation, it is also important to consider a range of management strategies during a crisis incident. These include ensuring the language of the perpetrator is used as far as is possible, and when it is appropriate to do so. If it appears that the terrorist is becoming high in emotion, it is useful for the negotiator to consider changing the topic of conversation, which may have led to such

high emotion, unless the negotiator has been directed to raise emotion by their commander.

Because of the potential presentation of the individual in crisis with such behaviors as distractibility, losing attention and difficulty in managing emotions, it is important for the negotiator to remain neutral throughout, even if the presentation of the perpetrator may at times enhance frustration. If the perpetrator becomes distracted by a noise, becomes angry or begins to focus solely on one topic of conversation and cannot be moved from this, is important to try to redirect them to something else. For example, this could be refocusing them to a safer topic of discussion that is not emotionally laden, or if they have access to a clock it may be useful to consider asking them the time simply as a method of redirection (although this will not be appropriate if demands have been made with clear timescales), or considering some other alternative method by which to distract the perpetrator.

With regards to the use of recapping of information, this is particularly useful with the individual in crisis who presented with these behavioral challenges. This may consist of reminding them of what has happened so far, in just a few sentences, as well as reminding them of what has been agreed and what will happen next. With regards to a resolution plan or a surrender plan, it is important to consider a straightforward plan with the individual in crisis who has such behavioral challenges. For example, it is useful for the information to be short and in bullet points, giving the perpetrator a copy of the resolution plan and discussing each bullet point with them. It is useful to recap the plan with them as well as being very clear as to how the external environment will be laid out once they exit the siege area. It is important that, when the perpetrator leaves the siege area, the only materials that are visible are those that need to be there, as to have too much materials on show may lead to overwhelming of the individual so that they could potentially make the decision to re-enter the siege area.

Core competencies of the crisis negotiator

The consideration as to changes in the negotiation process is a complex skill, and one which requires highly skilled negotiators. As such, it is important to consider the competencies of the negotiators who undertake such negotiations with terrorists. Previous research references the competencies required to be an effective crisis negotiator (Strentz, 1986; Fuselier, 1981). These include abilities to achieve trust and rapport, to elicit communications, to demonstrate total commitment to the negotiation process, to demonstrate respect for the perpetrator(s), to remain calm and to be effective at gathering information. Milner (2002) conducted research looking at the competencies required to be an effective negotiator in a forensic setting. This qualitative research looked at 10 participants, including six crisis negotiators, with a mean average time in service in this role of 7.5 years, one incident commander and hostage negotiation advisors.

The competencies identified by Milner (2002) fall in to 10 broad categories, namely adaptability, calmness, caring, commitment, detachment, discernment, dynamic thinking, effective communicator, humility and professional integrity. Adaptability involves being flexible, with an ability to adapt multiple roles within the team. Calmness involves dispositional and situational calmness, non-threatening, non-contentious, with a soothing voice. Caring involves demonstrating a genuine concern for the individual in crisis, an ability to demonstrate respect for them, liking people, with an ability to understand without condoning. Commitment involves a general

commitment to the principle of negotiation, to the demands of the role, and to volunteer in to this role. Detachment involves impartiality, such as the non-support of prejudices, stereotypes and assumptions. This also includes maintaining a distance from the issues and the individual in crisis, remaining focused on relevant issues (e.g. being detached from all that is not relevant), with the object of remaining focused on the ultimate goal. Discernment involves an ability to assimilate and assess information, with a further ability to explore new topics of conversation and information. Dynamic thinking involves being a quick thinker, a problem-solver, imaginative, resourceful, open-minded (not categorizing/classifying), with an ability to take the perspective of others and an appropriate sense of humor.

An effective communicator is an active listener and an effective talker, with an ability to develop understanding, to communicate understanding to the person in crisis, to develop empathy and rapport, to maintain boundaries of empathy and to persuade and/or influence. Humility involves a non-egotistical approach, recognizing personal limits, a willingness to ask and accept support, a willingness to accept supervision, a willingness to accept advice, an ability to work as a member of a team, to be non-competitive, accepting responsibility in the need to refresh their skills and an awareness of others' cultural and religious concerns. Finally, professional integrity involves the ability to adapt to changes in responsibility, being open to alternatives, respecting boundaries of the negotiation role, respecting their relative position within the organization, presenting with an ability to draw on prior professional experience, and an ability to make a distinction between rank and role with credibility.

Summary and future directions

This paper has aimed to identify the current approaches toward crisis negotiation and its application to negotiating with terrorists, with additional considerations as to the importance of considering traits, characteristics and behaviors of the terrorist when applying a current model of crisis negotiation. In particular, this paper has aimed to link a well-used model of negotiation to negotiating with terrorists, as well as modifying applications based on the terrorist's presentation. It is further important to consider that this model has many applications in a variety of crisis situations. This paper has aimed to highlight the complexity of individuals as part of the negotiation process, particularly individuals with strong traits and characteristics, and how negotiation models may be applied to such individuals. While information has been provided with regard to suggested methods of management in relation to traits, behaviors and characteristics, it is important to be flexible in response to any negotiation approaches used, with the need to evaluate crisis situations on an individual basis, and to see such interactions as dynamic.

The value of the Behavioral Influence Stairway Model is in its flexibility, in that it allows a clear structure to aid a chaotic situation, but it is designed to be flexible in response to each situation, where stages in the model may need to be omitted or returned to. Whilst the above negotiation strategies are based largely on clinical knowledge and experience, it would be useful for crisis negotiation to begin to develop a broader empirical basis to further develop such theories, models and approaches. In particular, it is important to consider empirical research with regard to the BISM, such as further assessment of the models used as part of live situations, including terrorist activities. In particular, this could be tested through the use of recorded accounts of the negotiations, which can be retained after the event. In

addition, evaluation could also take place of negotiators' perceptions of the model's value during a crisis incident, and the challenges of the model dependent upon how an individual presents. Nonetheless, the model itself appears a valuable tool, which can be easily applied to terrorist crisis situations. In order to further strengthen its application, it would be further beneficial to apply models of threat assessment as part of further development.

Finally, it is important to note that the suggested management strategies presented in this article may not translate to all situations, and an individual application will always apply. For example, such strategies may present with a range of differing challenges if an individual is planning to undertake the role of a suicide bomber as part of a crisis situation. Whilst there may be an option to incorporate some of the strategies if the 'suicide bomber' becomes barricaded and takes individuals hostage as a result of a failed effort to detonate a bomb, it is less likely to be effective if the terrorist is actually on route to the area, where negotiation strategies are weakened. Such strategies presented here are seen as an opportunity to discuss and widen the issues, and to be tailored, modified or disregarded with regard to situations that may arise.

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